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RECENT DECISIONS
decided, without reference to the announcements of the State Depart-
ment. Also, it may result in the deciding of decrees' validity on an
International law basis in disputes between former owners of seized
property and bona fide purchasers, thus, in effect, spelling out an event-
ual discarding of the other theories of enforcing or denying enforce-
ment to foreign decrees of expropriation. This will, therefore, cause
greater consideration of International law in the Municipal courts than
has been given up to now.
SHERIN SCHAPIRO
Libel and Slander: Defamation by Television Broadcast Is Action-
able Per Se-As a result of a presentation on a television pro-
gram known as "The Untouchables," plaintiff, a retired prison guard,
brought an action against defendant television companies alleging that
they had defamed him by presenting a sequence showing that a prison
guard accepted a bribe while attending a prisoner during a railway
transfer from a federal prison in Atlanta to Alcatraz. Plaintiff alleged
in the Superior Court of Georgia that such production clearly indicated
that such Federal officer aided and abetted the Federal prisoner, in this
case one Alphonse Capone, in his attempt to unlawfully escape from
confinement. Defendants demurrers were overruled and on appeal the
Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed and held that such television
presentation was actionable per se as "defamacast" and that plaintiff
could maintain the action either by showing that he was the guard spe-
cifically referred to or as a member of a two-man group. American
Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc. v. Simpson.'
The Court of Appeals of Georgia in this decision squarely faced
the problem of determining whether defamation by television is to be
categorized for purposes of litigation as libel or slander. The court
determined that television defamation as such is not easily classified
within the age-old torts of libel or slander, and furthermore, that the
medium of television has outmoded the principles which form the basis
for the distinction between the two actions. Therefore, this court took
upon itself the task of establishing a new cause of action uniquely de-
signed to cover situations involving defamation by means of mass media
communications. The court has termed this as "defamacast." The ra-
tionale which justifies this departure, at least in terms of nomenclature,
from the established forms of libel and slander is that modern law
must be able to keep pace with modern technological growth. The law
of television and radio defamation is quite obviously only as old as the
mediums themselves are, and therefore the body of decision law is
sparse. The basic distinction between libel and slander has been the
1126 S.E. 2d 873 (Ga. 1962).
1962-63]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
written defamation as opposed to the oral defamation. 2 It may be seen
at once how inadequate on a definitional basis this distinction has be-
come when we perceive that both radio and television programming
may combine both the written word in terms of prepared scripts and
the spoken word as finally communicated. Because libel is usually ac-
tionable per se without proof of special damages,3 great pressure has
been exerted upon the courts to find that radio and television defama-
tion is a published libel.
The litigation in this field although sparse has been more than cas-
ually interesting because the court contenders have usually been cele-
brities or at least "names in the news" whose reputations have allegedly
been damaged. The first well known television defamation case was
Remington v. Bentley4 in 1949. In this action the celebrated Miss Bent-
ley while on the "Meet the Press" program reiterated her charges that
Mr. Remington was a Communist. The court here referred to an earlier
radio defamation case 5 in declaring again that scripted material was
libelous. Extemporaneous defamatory matter not contained in a script
was previously held to be slander in an even earlier New York case.6
The court in the Remington case appeared to agree with these distinc-
tions as set forth in earlier radio cases and was prepared to cast televi-
sion defamations into the same mold. However, they were prevented
from being completely committed in this direction by deciding that Miss
Bentley's defamation was slander but nevertheless actionable since its
publication tended to injure Mr. Remington in his profession.7
The next case of import was in 1954 again in New York" where
the court, following the Remington decision, held that scripted television
defamation was actionable as libel but softened the impact by stating
that when a fictional drama is presented, the burden will be upon the
plaintiff to show that such defamation was "of or concerning him" to
avoid the possibility of coincidental use of names, places, or things.
This leads us to the celebrated case of Shor v. Billingsley.9 This 1956
case involved the extemporaneous remarks made by Mr. Billingsley
while performing as host on the television program "The Stork Club
Show." The court faced the problem of non-scripted television defama-
tion and held that it may be treated as libel rather than slander even
though such remarks were never reduced to writing. Both this decision
and the Georgia case now under discussion rely heavily upon the opin-
2 PRossER, LAW OF TORTS, §93, P. 584 (2d Ed. 1955).
3 Ibid. See RESTATEAiENT, TORTS, §569 (1938).
4 88 F.Supp. 166 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
5 Hartmann v. Winchell, 296 N.Y. 296, 73 N.E. 2d 30, 171 A.L.R. 759 (1947).6Locke v. Gibbons, 164 Misc. 877, 299 N.Y.S. 188 (1937); aff'd 253 App. Div.
887, 2 N.Y.S. 2d 1015 (1938).
7Supra note 2.
s Landau v. C.B.S., 205 Misc. 357, 128 N.Y.S. 2d 254 (1954).
9 158 N.Y.S. 2d 476 (1956).
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ion of Fuld, J., concurring, in Hartmann v. Winchcll10 in which he set
forth the rationale that capacity for harm (in this case dissemination
by radio) must be more of a governing factor than the older distinction
of written and non-written defamations:
If the base of liability for defamation is to be broadened in the
case of radio broadcasting, justification should be sought not in
the fiction that reading from a paper ipso facto constitutes a pub-
lication by writing, but in a frank recognition that sound policy
requires such a result .... That defamation by radio in the ab-
sence of a script or transcription, lacks the measure of durability
possessed by written libel, in no wise lessens its capacity for
harm. Since the element of damage is, historically, the basis of
the common law action for defamation . . ., and since it is as
reasonable to presume damage from the nature of the medium
employed when a slander is broadcast by radio as when published
by writing, both logic and policy point the conclusion that defa-
mation by radio should be actionable per se.11 [emphasis by the
court].
Today the Georgia court has gone one step further and has put a
new label on a principle which other cases have suggested: that policy
requirements of the law demand a departure from common law rules,
that mass media communication is radically different from anything
which the common law could regard as a vehicle for the transmission
of slanders, that because of the scope and magnitude of the harm and
because of the mixture between spoken and written words-for all
these reasons there is a need for a new classification of tort defamation
to apply to television broadcasting and that classification Judge Eber-
hardt and his colleagues prefer to label "defamacast." 12
The question now presents itself as to the impact of such a new
classification both upon the substantive law requirements of actionable
defamation, and upon the possible strict liability which may be imposed
upon television broadcasters. In the Simpson case, now under discus-
sion, the problem was not faced and the only clue we have to future
action is this footnote comment made after indicating that "defama-
cast" is actionable per se:
The libel and slander classification case law is not controlling
in such a category. However, the great body of the case law will
not become obsolete in the area because certain principles such
as what is defamatory, what is privileged and so forth will con-
tinue to apply. A more complete development of the rules deal-
ing with "defamacast" will of necessity await later cases.
13
At first glance it might well appear that television broadcasters had
better look to their insurers, since the likelihood of the imposition of
10 Supra note 4.
21 Supra note 1, at 879.
"2Supra note 1, at 879.
USupra note 1, at 879.
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strict liability could well be inferred from this current decision. This
would be in contradistinction to the modern trend away from strict
liability principles, as Dean Prosser points out,1 4 even though he goes
on to say:
In view of its enormous potentialities for harm, there seems to
be little reason to distinguish the radio from the newspaper; and
so long as strict liability remains in the law of libel, it is at least
arguable that the radio beyond all other media should be subject
to it.' 5
This writer is convinced the same argument would apply to television
broadcasting as well as to radio.
Before finally committing oneself to a position, two other factual
conditions should be examined in addition to "capacity for harm" which
has already been treated in relation to the "defamacast" opinion. One is
that the Georgia Court took notice of the fact that the presentation in
the case at bar was of a "stale" news event as opposed to a "current"
one; this condition coupled with the fact that the program was only for
profit-making purposes may serve to qualify the decision of the court.
Future cases may be distinguished on the basis that their factual con-
siderations involve either public service programming or timely current
events.
One final consideration must be given to the concept of the "deepest
pocket" theory which is embodied in the rationale of "capacity for
harm." Indeed, the theory of placing the burden of loss on the one
party who can most readily absorb it is not new to the law. However,
as Dean Prosser again points out:
Courts have been reluctant to saddle an industry with the entire
burden of the harm it may cause, for fear that it may prove
ruinously heavy. This is particularly true where the liability may
extend ... to a new industry, which may be unduly hampered in
its development.... :1 [Emphasis added]
The full import of the Simpson case will probably not be felt for
many years, however, it cannot be denied that the court is making
progress in clearing up the long-standing confusion between libel and
slander by insisting that television defamation shall be actionable per se
without proof of special damages.
ROBERT L. HERSH
24 Supra note 2, §94, p. 603.
15 Supra note 2, at 606.
16 Supra note 2, at 20.
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